第九章 Incomplete information：We incorporate uncertainty in games in this chapter. That is, at least on player is uncertain about payoffs. We will learn how to specify Bayesian Nash equilibrium in these games and introduce different risk attitude when individuals face uncertainty.9.1Introduction and preliminary:We introduce uncertainty individual faces and review basic probability theory, especially the calculation of expected values.[单选题]Player 1 chooses either U or D; player 2 simultaneously chooses either L, M or R.Both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p
9.2Bayesian Games:In this section , we will study how to incorporate incomplete information into standard games. Especially, we will learn the components of Bayesian game and the solution concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
9.3Bayesian Nash equilibrium:In this section we will show that in Bayesian games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium survives in IESDS. Therefore, we are able to simplify a Bayesian game by IESDS firstly to specify its Bayesian Nash.
9.4Risk Aversion:We introduce another risk attitude called risk aversion in this section. We will study the reason of risk aversion and the concept of risk premium.
How many strategies player 1 has?选项:[8, 6, 2
, 4]
[单选题]Player 1 chooses either U or D; player 2 simultaneously chooses either L, M or R.Both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p
What is the reduced game after iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies of each type?选项:[
, 
, 
, 
][单选题]Player 1 chooses either U or M; player 2 chooses either L or C.Both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p
How many strategies player 1 has?选项:[2, 8, 4, 6][单选题]Player 1 chooses either U or D; player 2 simultaneously chooses either L, M or R.Both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p
How many strategies player 2 has?选项:[2, 6, 4, 8][单选题]Player 1 chooses either U or M; player 2 chooses either L or C.Both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p
How many strategies player 2 has?选项:[4, 2, 6, 8]
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